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State Formation and Autonomy: Does Chinese Practice in Tibet Meet 
International Standards? 
Professor Michael C. Davis, University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law. 
mcdavis@hku.hk , 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, New Orleans. (A revised version of this paper is currently due out in 
Orbis) 
 
With regard to contested territory along China’s present borders the Chinese 
Government has long offered up assertive claims in the language of state sovereignty 
that is stridently dismissive of other claimants.  It has recently taken to labeling claims 
to peripheral territory as “core interest,” as if such labeling might eliminate any right 
to offer competing claims, whether they relate to sovereignty or merely to appropriate 
standards of behavior.1 While the past year has most notably seen the extension of 
such designation to regions beyond China’s current control in the East and South 
China seas, Beijing has long taken such aggressive posture with regard to occupied 
areas along its Western borders, especially in Tibet and the Uyghur areas of present-
day Xinjiang. Each of these areas share the status of being the homeland of a 
distinctive indigenous nationality with a separate language, culture and history. Both 
were the targets of military occupation by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) soon 
after its founding in 1949. While the Tibetan and Uyghur areas share in common 
aggressive and dismissive Chinese national minority policies and laws, there 
distinctive history and analytical posture make the coverage of one case, Tibet, a 
fruitful vehicle for exploring the implications of China’s nationality policies more 
generally. After decades of Chinese posturing over foreign criticisms and discussions 
with the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan case offers a telling 
example with deep implications both for China’s indigenous Tibetan population and 
for elaborating an international response to such state behavior. The Tibet issue has 
been most directly of concern to China’s immediate neighbor, India, but has also been 
a long-standing foreign policy concern in both the US and Europe. 
Rhetorically, the positions publicly taken by the Tibetan leadership in exile 
and the Chinese government appear to overlap considerably.2 The Government-in-
Exile under the Dalai Lama, based in Dharamsala, India, has long sought a renewed 
agreement granting Tibet “genuine autonomy” under the Chinese constitution, as 
formally submitted to the Chinese Government in the 2008 Tibetan Memorandum of 
Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People.3 As discussed below, the Chinese 
Government has likewise claimed to offer autonomy under its national minority laws. 
Such autonomy was first promised in respect to Tibet under a Seventeen-point !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Minnie Chan, “Beijing lists unity and security as core interests,” South China 
Morning Post, 7 September 2011. Sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity 
and national unity were listed as core interest in China’s white paper on “China’s 
Peaceful Development.” 
2 Warren Smith sees the two sides position as irreconcilable, as the central issue for 
Tibetans is the maintenance of Tibetan national identity and for the Chinese is to 
extinguish it. Warren W. Smith,  China's Tibet: Autonomy or Assimilation 
(Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield,  2008) at 279. 
3 “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,” Issued During the 
Eighth Sino-Tibetan Meeting, November 4, 2008 (hereinafter “Tibetan 
Memorandum”). See also “Summary of the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for 
the Tibetan People,” Dharamsala, India, November 16, 2008. 
! 2!
Agreement reached between the PRC and the Dalai Lama in 1951.4 While China has 
since extended this autonomy promise in much more limited form to fifty-five 
designated national minorities, the Tibetan case of an historic nation on China’s 
border has remained distinctive, as the only “national minority” with which the PRC 
has entered a bilateral agreement promising a high degree of autonomy under an 
indigenous form of self-rule. The Tibet case shares only with the Uyghur case the 
status of a border nationality with historically distinct identity occupying a substantial 
portion of the territory currently ruled by the PRC,5 but even the Uyghur do not have 
a comparable agreement with the PRC government. The Seventeen-Point Agreement 
is widely believed to be the precursor to the “one country, two systems” model, with 
its “high degree of autonomy” now applied in Hong Kong and Macau, though the 
PRC government refuses to apply such “Hong Kong model” in Tibet. China’s 
designation of fifty-five national minorities may aim at watering down the distinctive 
status and consequent obligations to the Tibetan people. Recent calls to eliminate 
even these national minority protections may aim at complete assimilation.6 Except 
for the Tibetans, Uyghur and Mongols, most minority nationalities are well within 
historically occupied Chinese territory and do not contest their nationality status.  
An assessment of Chinese public pronouncements and policies in light of 
international practices and standards may shed light on the current impasse and 
suggest possible alternatives going forward. This paper addresses these Chinese 
policies and pronouncements in four parts, discussing: first, to set the tone, the 
stridency of China’s recent public statements in the shadow of the 2008 Tibetan 
uprising and the Beijing Olympics; second, historical policies and current practice 
regarding the claimed provision of autonomy in Tibet; third, international standards 
regarding similarly situated indigenous populations; and fourth, recommendations 
regarding both Chinese policies and international foreign policy responses. These 
recommendations will suggest the usefulness of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter “UN Declaration”) as a framework and recommend 
the 2008 Tibetan Memorandum as a negotiating document that approximates these 
international standards. That recommendation will encourage a Chinese path that 
embodies the same spirit of inventiveness that it employed in creating the “one 
country, two systems” model now applied in Hong Kong and Macau and proposed for 
Taiwan. Such approach would enable China to shape a hybrid Tibetan solution that 
achieves the genuine autonomy embraced by the Tibetan Memorandum. The present 
analysis will not question the Tibetan exile government’s formal stance on seeking 
autonomy versus independence, as this is a question with both substantive and 
strategic implications for Tibetans to decide. 
A China that employs its rising power to repress indigenous and other internal 
nationalities and to intimidate its neighbors cannot help but pay an international price 
in suspicion and criticism for such aggressive stance. In this sense Tibet has always 
been part of a larger policy concern that stretches beyond border security and internal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet 
on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951 (hereinafter 
“Seventeen-point Agreement”). 
5 Tibetan areas currently occupied by the PRC make up roughly one-quarter of the 
present PRC. 
6 James Leibold, “Toward a Second Generation of Ethnic Policies?” China Brief, Vol. 
12/13 (2012); David Kelly, “Rethinking Ethnic Policy,” China Policy, June 11, 2012 
brief.policycn.com  
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resources. For China, seeing Tibet in limited security terms has been costly. With 
China’s rise and increasing global reach and potential this price can only increase. In 
this sense, a viable solution to the Tibet problem may contribute to the effort to 
address wider peripheral concerns beyond Tibet, including even the Uyghur case. In 
moving forward in this regard China may also acquire a gentler less threatening face 
in its other international endeavors, reducing concerns currently associated with 
China’s rise. Since the Chinese Government has rejected suggestions of a more 
moderate Tibet stance, realization of such policy objectives is likely to require 
international diplomatic engagement along similar policy lines for some time to come. 
 
I. China’s Reaction to Recent Tibetan Disturbances and Discussions 
The March 2008 Tibetan uprising, the subsequent Chinese crackdown and the 
international protests that followed the Olympic torch attracted considerable 
international concern, embarrassing Chinese officials as they prepared to host the 
2008 Beijing Olympics. They faced considerable international pressure to meet with 
the Dalai Lama’s representatives and resolve this long-standing dispute.7 Though 
Chinese officials quickly moved into damage control their subsequent actions and 
statements raise doubt about their intentions. The approach taken seemed aimed at 
putting out the immediate fire until the Olympics had passed and then bringing the 
Tibet problem under firm control. This mode of proceeding has long plagued Chinese 
policies in respect of indigenous minorities in its periphery and has long attracted 
skepticism about its intentions in areas it identifies as core interests. Chinese officials 
quickly held an informal meeting with the Dalai Lama’s representatives in Shenzhen 
near Hong Kong in May of 2008 and scheduled the seventh and eighth rounds in their 
ongoing formal dialogue to begin in July and late October that year, a time line just 
sufficient to get past the Beijing Olympics.  
While international leaders and diplomats held out hope for substantive Sino-
Tibetan dialogue the marching orders for Chinese representatives were more limited. 
They merely reiterated China’s long-standing official position that Sino-Tibetan 
“contacts and dialogues were about the Dalai Lama's personal future, and not so-
called "China-Tibet negotiation" or "dialogue between Han and Tibetan people".8 
They insisted on three “stops” to: “stop activities aimed at splitting China, stop 
plotting and inciting violence and stop disrupting and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic 
Games.” This was later refined to “four non-supports”: “not to support activities to 
disturb the upcoming Beijing Olympic Games, not to support plots to fan violent 
criminal activities, not to support and concretely curb the violent terrorist activities of 
the "Tibetan Youth Congress" and not to support any argument and activity to seek 
"Tibet independence" and split the region from the country.”9 The exiled Tibetan 
leadership has long met these conditions, and there is no record of the rather moderate 
Tibetan Youth Congress engaging in terrorist activities.  
Though their earlier efforts in the 1950s to win over the Dalai Lama’s support 
belie such claim, Chinese officials dismissively challenged the Dalai Lama’s 
credentials to represent the Tibetan people, insisting that he must speak to the central 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Willy Lam, “Beijing’s Post-Olympics Shakedown in Xinjiang and Tibet,” China 
Brief, Vol. VIII, Issue 17, September 2008, at 2-4. 
8 “Chinese official urges Dalai Lama to respond with sincerity after recent contact,” 
Xinhua, Beijing, July 6, 2008. 
9 Id. 
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government as a “common person.”10 They launched vociferous personal attacks on 
the Dalai Lama, labeling him a “wolf in monk’s robes.” All branches of the exile 
Tibetan community were lumped together and castigated as the “Dalai clique.”11 
Though these Chinese arguments are generally viewed with disdain around the globe, 
few foreign leaders have been willing to publicly confront the Chinese stand. The UN 
has been especially missing in action, as measured by recent 40-day hunger strike of a 
Tibetan exile even to persuade UN officials to look into the matter. There has been no 
sign of engagement by the Special UN Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights. Most 
substantive research to challenge the Chinese official position has been limited to 
private academic and NGO work. 
In response to a Chinese request made at the July 2008 Sino-Tibetan meeting 
the Dalai Lama’s representatives in early November presented a formal Tibetan 
“Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People” outlining their 
argument for autonomy under the Chinese Constitution.12 The Tibetan Memorandum 
sets forth Tibetan “aspirations” for genuine autonomy and self-government in eleven 
policy areas, including language, culture, religion, education, environmental 
protection, utilization of natural resources, economic development and trade, public 
health, internal public security, population migration and cultural, educational, and 
religious exchanges with other countries. As discussed below, existing unfulfilled 
national ethnic autonomy policies enacted under Article 4 of the PRC Constitution 
already promise autonomy in nearly all of these areas. The exception may be those 
relating to immigration and external exchanges in the commercial and cultural areas, 
which appear instead to track policies similar to those applied under the PRC 
Constitution Article 31 “one country, two systems” formula applied in Hong Kong. 
All of the autonomy concerns addressed by the Tibetan Memorandum would fall 
under the guideline commitments articulated in the UN Declaration. Moreover, there 
appears to be nothing in the below-discussed law on national minority autonomy that 
would prohibit these extra protections in response to the unique local character of a 
designated national minority.  
In the interest of self-government, the Tibetan Memorandum seeks to limit the 
Central Government’s current facile override of Tibetan autonomy. It includes a 
specification that local laws within the scope of autonomy not be subject to central 
approval as is now required in minority areas under the Chinese national minority 
statute and that the terms of their agreement with the Central Government not be 
subject to the Central Government’s unilateral amendment. The Tibetans appear to 
recognize that too much Central oversight and manipulation has lead to the failure of 
the current autonomy policies. They further proposed to unify into one autonomous 
region the thirteen contiguous Tibetan areas that China has designated under its 
national minority autonomy laws. As these areas are contiguous the breakdown into 
separate areas seems aimed at limiting Tibetan self-government. The Tibetan 
Memorandum acknowledges the continuing application of the Chinese socialist 
system within Tibet, though one may doubt whether that economic system persist in 
China today. Finally, the Tibetan Memorandum acknowledges the authority of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 “China unwilling to broach Tibet with Dalai Lama,” Indo-Asian News Service, 
Beijing, Tuesday, July 15, 2008. 11!Michael C. Davis, “For Talks to Succeed China Must Admit to a Tibet Problem,” 
YaleGlobal Online, May 16, 2008. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/talks-succeed-
china-must-admit-tibet-problem !
12 Tibetan Memorandum, supra note 3. 
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NPC and other organs of the Central Government and would accept application of the 
system of local people’s congresses with locally chosen representatives within the 
Tibetan autonomous area. The Tibetan Memorandum was presented as a starting 
position for further negotiation. As is discussed below, these proposals track rather 
closely the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that 
China supported in the UN General Assembly. 
The Chinese response was quick and harsh. In an early November 2008 
Chinese State Council press conference, Mr. Zhu Weiqun of the United Front Works 
Department attacked the Tibetan position as essentially camouflage for 
independence.13 The accompanying State Council Address likened the Tibetan notion 
of “genuine autonomy” to the “high degree of autonomy” allowed Hong Kong. The 
Tibetans were accused of seeking “half-independence,” and “covert independence,” 
though no explanation is given why the same language applied to Hong Kong means 
only autonomy. The State Council Address further accuses the exiled Tibetans of 
“colluding with such dregs as ‘democracy activists’, ‘falunkun (Falungong) elements’ 
and ‘Eastern Turkistan terrorists.’” The Tibetan Memorandum’s proposal to gain 
control over immigration into Tibet is likened to “ethnic cleansing.” The exile 
government is said to be a “small group of splittists.” The meetings were essentially 
damage control, with some international public relations objectives, mostly aimed at 
persuading the Dalai Lama to “give up his splitting activities”. The State Council 
Address declared, “We never discussed the so-called ‘Tibet issue” and will “never 
make a concession.” Demonstrating even greater insensitivity to Tibetan concerns, in 
January 2009 the PRC created a new holiday to celebrate the “liberation” of Tibet 
they have labeled “Serfs Emancipation Day.”14 As if this were not strident enough, 
various reports have likened the Dalai Lama to Hitler and characterized his policies as 
similar to the Nazi regime.15 More recently these aggressive policies have been 
encouraged by calls for dropping historical minority policies and instituting 
unambiguous policies to assimilate Tibetans and other national minorities. The 
proponents of these views cite historical Western policies of assimilation and argue 
that current national minority recognition encourages separatism.16 
After the State Council Address the Dalai Lama’s representative published a 
note responding to these various criticisms and emphasizing that the type of self-
governing autonomy sought in the Tibetan Memorandum is consistent with both the 
PRC Constitution and the practice of autonomy around the world—that posed no risk 
to the sovereignty of the country.17 They emphasized that there was a difference of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Address at the Press Conference Press Conference by the State Council Office,” 
Beijing, November 10, 2008 (hereinafter “State Council Address”) (address given by 
Mr. Zhu Weiqun, Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department of 
the CPC Central Committee). The United Front Work Department is responsible for 
national minority affairs. 
14 “Tibet Sets ‘Serfs Emancipation Day,’” Xinhua, January 19, 2009, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-01/19/content_7410293.htm 
15 Scott McDonald, “Chinese Website: Dalai Lama has Nazi Policies,” Associated 
Press, March 24, 2012. 
16 See Leibold, supra, note 6. 
17 Note on the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People, 
Dharamsala, India, January, 2010. http://www.tibetpolicy.eu/resource-center/official-
documents/321-note-on-the-memorandum-on-genuine-autonomy-for-the-tibetan-
people  
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opinion on history and that this should be no “obstacle to seeking a mutually 
beneficial common future within the PRC.”18 The Tibetan exile movement also 
convened a large Special Meeting of the Tibetans in Diaspora in Dharamsala, India in 
mid-November, 2008 where Tibetans expressed doubts about Chinese intentions but 
resolved to continue efforts at achieving genuine autonomy under the Middle-Way 
approach, reflecting the label the Dalai Lama has labeled his autonomy proposals now 
reflected in the Tibetan Memorandum.19  
As of late 2011 things remain at an impasse, with Chinese efforts to control 
opposition in Tibet and isolate the Dalai Lama continuing. Offering no concessions 
regarding the character of autonomy, the Chinese Government in its 2009 White 
Paper on Tibet claims that autonomy is already provided under existing national 
minority laws.20 As is discussed in the next section, this essentially means no 
autonomy at all. In these discussions the Tibetan side, being the least empowered, has 
made the most concession, conceding up front to Chinese demands regarding 
sovereignty. The quid-pro-quo for this concession is supposed to be  “genuine 
autonomy” under the “Middle Way” approach.21 The Tibetan exile leaders clearly 
appreciate the relative weakness of their bargaining position. Their hope is that such 
autonomy will promote both democracy and human rights in Tibet.22 There is urgency 
to the Tibetan cause both as to ongoing repression and to secure their long-term 
survival. With increasing Chinese immigration into Tibet, Tibetan are concerned that 
the 1.3 billion Chinese may eventually swamp the 5.5 million Tibetans in the vast 
mountainous regions of Tibet, leaving them a minority in their own land.23 By some 
estimates this has already happened in the Tibetan cities.24 With the Dalai Lama’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Id., at p. 3. 
19 Id., p. 2. See also, “China’s Communist Regime Loosing Ground,” Agencies, 
January 16, 2008. http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=651926  
20White Paper on “Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet” (hereinafter “2009 
White Paper”), Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, March 2009, 
Beijing. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/02/content_7527376.htm 
Interview with Chinese Officials Liu Hongji (and Wang Xiaobin), Tibetology 
Research Center, Beijing, August 25, 2006. 
21 The Dalai Lama began to articulate his “middle way” position in speeches in the 
1980s before the US Congress and before the European Parliament. Address to 
Members of the United States Congress: Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet, 21 
September 1987; Address to Members of the European Parliament by His Holiness 
the Dalai Lama, 15 June 1988. See The Middle-Way Approach, A Framework for 
Resolving the Issue of Tibet, Department of Information and Public Relations, CTA 
Dharamsala, 2006. http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=115&rmenuid=11  
22 Interview with HH the Dalai Lama, Dharamsala, India, August 9, 2006.  
23 Tabulations on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: 
Nationalities Publishing House, 2003). Available at 
http://www.purpleculture.net/tabulation-on-the-2000-population-census-of-the-
peoples-republic-of-china-3-volumes-p-753/  
24 See June Teufel Dreyer, “Economic Development in Tibet Under the People’s 
Republic of China,” in Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer, eds. Contemporary 
Tibet: Politics, Development and Society in a Disputed Region (London: M.E. Sharpe, 
2006), at 129-151, 139; Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. 
Authenticating Tibet, Answers to China’s 100 Questions (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2008) (Comments by Andrew M. Fischer) at 144-151. 
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transfer of political leadership to the elected exile Prime Minister, Lobsang Sangay, 
the Chinese willingness to meet with Tibetan representatives has also been in doubt, 
with the fiction that they are only discussing the Dalai Lama’s status now 
undermined. 
 
II. Historical Claims and Present Practice in Tibet 
 While the Dalai Lama has gone to great lengths to avoid a discussion of Sino-
Tibetan history in his formal discussions with the Chinese Government, history has 
lurked in the background of nearly all Chinese claims. The Dalai Lama takes the view 
that agreement on history is not possible without misrepresentation, as he declares a 
willingness to work out an autonomy arrangement in the shadow of the present 
reality. China, on the other hand, has not been shy about reinterpreting history to 
justify present practice, especially when there are doubts about the historical 
legitimacy of its position. This has led it to advance a claim of ancient title and 
subsequent “liberation” with respect to Tibet that the Dalai Lama disputes. At a 
general level this dispute appears less a battle over the historical narrative than its 
interpretation. This section will consider in two parts the twin foundations of the 
present dispute, historical title and present practice. 
 
A. Assessing the Historical Sino-Tibetan Relationship 
 
“Tibet has been an inseparable part of China since ancient times.” From 2009 
Chinese White Paper on Tibet 25  
 
Though Chinese officials are fond of repeating the above statement, a closer 
look reveals a more nuanced story and hardly one that would sufficiently justify 
present-day sovereignty claims on an historical title basis.26 The general disrepute of 
imperial claims would alone call into question present-day sovereignty claims based 
on historical empire. But the factual record of the Tibetan case raises further question, 
as Chinese efforts at imperial conquest met Tibetan resistance for nearly a thousand 
years. This historical record does highlight the special character of the historical Sino-
Tibetan relationship and may offer a yardstick by which to assess current practices. A 
brief overview of the historical record may assist our analysis. 
Imperial China often faced external threats on its western borders and 
attempted to neutralize these threats by conquering and assimilating its neighbors. 
Though Tibet was sometimes a target of such efforts, its remote mountain location 
made it less of a threat and inhibited Chinese efforts at conquest. After Tibet’s own 
imperial age during the Chinese Tang Dynasty it rarely posed sufficient threat to 
justify a costly conquest and direct rule.27 Rather, a loose imperial association 
prevailed. It was only during the last Chinese dynasty, the Qing, in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, that military invasion and imperial occupation sometimes 
occurred. Even then Tibet was treated as a vassal state and part of China’s external 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 2009 White Paper, supra note 17. 
26 Eliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics (Washington: East 
West Center, Policies Studies 7, 2004). 
27 See Christopher I. Beckwith, Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, 24, 167 (1987). 
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empire subject to indirect rule. 28 Eliot Sperling identifies China’s claim that Tibet 
was always an inseparable part of China as a late twentieth century invention.29  
Present-day Chinese accounts usually date China’s claimed incorporation of 
Tibet to the Mongol-ruled Yuan Dynasty (1270-1368). The Tibetan abbot Sakya 
Pandita is reported to have subordinated Tibet to the emerging Mongol Empire in 
1247AD. With some initial Tibetan resistance, the Mongols invaded and establish 
administrative control in 1267. It was subsequent to this in 1270 that the Mongol 
King, Kubilai Khan, proclaimed the Yuan Dynasty in China. Even then China was 
administered separately from Tibet among the Mongol’s conquest.30  
Warren Smith describes a rather carefully calibrated diplomatic relationship 
from the Yuan Dynasty forward between China’s emperors and ruling Tibetan lamas. 
Imperial attempts at subordination would be matched with Tibetan resistance.31 In the 
Yuan Dynasty, leading Tibetan lamas served in a religious advisory role for the 
Mongol emperors—a role characterized by the Tibetans as a Cho-yon or patron-priest 
relationship. 32  During the succeeding Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) this 
relationship persisted, though the Ming court seemed to value Tibetan lamas more for 
their intermediary role in dealing with the still threatening Mongols. The succeeding 
Manchu dominated Qing Dynasty (1636-1910) featured the highest level of Chinese 
intervention and sometimes conquest in Tibet, though no serious incorporation of a 
Tibet that remained separate from China. Complex interplay and protocol would offer 
the emperor’s support for rule in Tibet by the Gelugpa Buddhist sect under the Dalai 
Lama.33 In the 18th century the expanding Qing intruded more and more on Tibetan 
autonomy. By 1720, under the Emperor Kang Hsi, the Qing occupied and ruled Tibet, 
though the Qing garrison was withdrawn when he died in 1722. Such occupation was 
restored later and off and on in the decades to follow. During its occupations, to 
advance its efforts at indirect rule the Qing set in place a permanent government 
under a Tibetan Kashag or council. The Qing was also represented in Lhasa by its 
Amban. Qing control always involved at most indirect imperial rule, with central 
Tibet considered part of the Qing’s “exterior empire.”34  
 From 1911 until the PRC occupation in 1950 Tibet was de facto independent. 
To justify their invasion and occupation, Chinese officials claim Tibet during this 
period was hopelessly feudal and savage.35 One doubts that feudal Tibet suffered from 
any worse conditions than its Asian neighbors. Commentators contest recent Chinese !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Pamela Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial 
Ideology (University of California, 1999) at 327-336; Sperling, supra, note 24, at 28-
30. Both Crossley and Sperling note that these areas fell not under the Qing civil 
government but under the Court of Colonial Affairs (lifan yuan).   
29 Id. at 28. 
30 Warren W. Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-
Tibetan Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996) at 83-100. 
31 Id.  
32 Sperling, supra note 23, at 30-31. 
33 Id. at 111-112. The title “Dalai Lama” was introduced during the Ming Dynasty by 
a Mongol leader Altan Khan, designating Sonam Gyatso, the abbot of the Drepung 
monastery, the third Dalai Lama. Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. 
Authenticating Tibet, supra, note 21, at 35-36. The word Dalai derives from the 
Mongolian word Tale, for oceans.  
34 Smith, Tibetan Nation, supra note 27, at 121, 134-138, 145, 151. 
35 2009 White Paper, supra note 3. 
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claims of systematic savagery and serfdom.36 Even Melvyn Goldstein, who is often 
cited in Chinese official accounts, notes that Tibetan serfs “were not necessarily 
downtrodden.”37 It seemed that Tibet had a traditional land-based economy with 
hierarchical social structures that are not uncommon in such systems.38 At this time 
Tibet also began the first stages of political modernization. With a council or cabinet 
called the Kashag in place since the late Qing Dynasty, Tibetans had in the 1860s 
introduced a national assembly or Tshongdu, which included representatives of 
Lhasa’s monasteries and secular officials.39 In recent Tibetan exile a form of liberal 
constitutional democracy has emerged, including universal suffrage in the exile 
community, a directly elected prime minister served by a cabinet or Kashag, a 
Supreme Justice Commission, and an elected Assembly of Tibetan People’s 
Deputies.40 The Dalai Lama has recently withdrawn from temporal rule in favor of the 
elected Prime Minister, a situation he promises will persist in some agreed form in an 
autonomous Tibet.41 
The period of de facto independence also witnessed the introduction of the 
language of modern statehood and sovereignty. In negotiations with Tibet and British 
India, Republican Chinese officials generally acknowledged that Tibet had a special 
status with only Chinese indirect rule. In negotiations at Simla, India in 1913, the 
British advanced a notion, similar to that China had accepted for Mongolia, of inner 
and outer Tibet. This distinguished a largely independent central Tibet under Chinese 
suzerainty from a subordinate Eastern Tibet under Chinese sovereignty. All parties 
initialed the Simla Convention accepting this view, though the Chinese ultimately did 
not ratify it, as they were dissatisfied with the stipulated boundary between inner and 
outer Tibet.42 In various other negotiations in the 1930s, China acknowledged Tibet’s 
high degree of autonomy under nominal Chinese rule. The United States and Britain 
early on tended to characterize Chinese imperial territorial claims as suzerainty.43 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet 
(comments of Robert Barnett), supra note 21, at 81-84. 
37 Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951 (University of 
California Press, 1989), at 5. 
38 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet 
(comments of Katia Buffetrille), supra note 21, at 293-298. 
39 Id. at 10-31. 
40 Lobsang Sangay, “Tibet: Exiles Journey,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3, 
pp. 119-130 (2003). 
41 Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity and the Basic Features of the Constitution, 
February 26, 1992 http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=101&rmenuid=11 ; The 
Middle-way Approach, supra note 18. The 2011 election in the Tibetan diaspora 
resulted in election of legal academic Lobsang Sangay as the first lay Prime Minister 
or Kalon Tripa. Abhishek Madhukar, “Exiled Tibetans elect political heir to Dalai 
Lama, Reuters,” April 27, 2011. 
42 Goldstein, supra, note 34, at 68-80, 832-841.   
43 “(A) distinctive element of the feudal suzerainty relationship is that the suzerain 
holds the source of the governmental authority of the vassal state whose ruler he 
grants the right to exercise the authority autonomously.” Michael C. van Walt van 
Praag, The Status of Tibet (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987) at 105-06. See also 
United States Policy Concerning the Legal Status of Tibet, 1942-1956, Historical 
Division, Department of State, Research Project No. 403, November, 1957, US 
National Archives 793B.oo/11-157. The British role has inspired the Chinese to 
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As the Dalai Lama explains it, when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
invaded Tibet in 1951, he faced an offer he could not refuse for Tibet to become part 
of the PRC.44  With weak international support to do otherwise, he accepted a 
Seventeen-Point Agreement “on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.”45 
(hereinafter “17-point Agreement”)The Chinese at the time appeared more concerned 
with gaining territory and resisting outside imperialism than with saving Tibetans 
from feudal poverty. As the only treaty-like agreement with any of its purported 
national minorities, the 17-point Agreement acknowledged the special status of Tibet 
and promised autonomy under Tibet’s indigenous system of self-rule. This agreement 
is not unlike those commonly associated with indigenous people’s elsewhere to justify 
recognition of indigenous status. Early on China failed to keep these special 
commitments, pushing Tibet toward “democratic reform.” Chaffing under the thumb 
of their new cadre rulers in March of 1959 Tibetans rebelled and the Dalai Lama fled 
Tibet.46 This brought to an end centuries of Tibetan self-rule. On March 28, 1959, 
after the Dalai Lama’s departure, China dismissed the local government and for the 
first time in history established direct Chinese rule over all of Tibet.  The Preparatory 
Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR), which had been established 
under the Dalai Lama’s earlier formal chairmanship, was declared the official 
governing body. 47  In September 1965 the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 
including about half the area occupied by Tibetan people in what is commonly called 
central Tibet, was proclaimed under the first People’s Congress of the TAR. Under 
the national minority laws discussed in the following subsection Tibet no longer 
enjoys a special status, being lumped together with fifty-five designated “national 
minorities.”  
 
B. The PRC’s Practice of Autonomy in Tibet 
China’s national minority autonomy policies applied in Tibet and throughout 
the country are promulgated in the current 1982 PRC Constitution48 and in the Law 
on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA) passed in 1984, as revised in 2001.49 
Article 4 of PRC Constitution provides that, “Regional autonomy is practiced in areas 
where people of minority nationalities live in concentrated communities.”  Under 
LRNA Article 15 autonomous areas carry out their role “under the unified leadership 
of the State Council and shall be subordinate to it.” The LRNA promises national 
minority autonomy in respect of language, education, political representation, 
administrative appointments, local economic and financial policies, and the use of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
cynically argue the British created the Tibet issue in their attempts to carve up China. 
Yanqi Chen, “How Britain Created the ‘Tibet Issue,’” China Daily, June 6, 2012. 
44 Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama 
(HarperCollins Publishers, 1991) at 64; Goldstein, supra note 34, at 798-803. 
45 Seventeen-point Agreement, supra note 4. See Goldstein, supra note 34, at 759-
772. 
46 Dalai Lama, supra note 41, at 136. 
47 Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region (PCTAR), Established 
in April 1956. 
48 PRC Constitution (1982), Articles 4, 59, 65, 89 and 112-122. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html  
49 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy 
(hereinafter LRNA), 1984, revised 2001. 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2007-04/13/content_1207139.ht  
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local natural resources. Effective exercise of such promised autonomy is in doubt. 
These laws are narrowly applied and allow substantial intrusion of central control and 
the national political system into local affairs. They contrast sharply with the flexible 
approach under PRC Constitution Article 31, as applied in Hong Kong and Macau.  
The 1982 PRC Constitution, passed during China’s liberalizing phase, appears 
to offer enhanced local autonomy. Along with the LRNA, it includes the power, 
subject to higher approval, to enact “regulations on the exercise of autonomy (zizhi 
tiaoli) and other separate regulations (danxing tiaoli) in light of the political, 
economic and cultural characteristics.”50 “Regulations on the exercise of autonomy” 
have the status of a sub-constitution or basic law and it is expected that one such 
regulation will be enacted in each autonomous area.51 The required higher approval 
must typically come from the next higher level of government, for autonomous 
regions the Central Government and for autonomous prefectures and counties the!
provincial government. None of the PRC’s five autonomous regions, being Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia, have received approval for such 
basic regulation on the exercise of autonomy. The one attempt at enacting a basic 
regulation on the exercise of autonomy in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) 
went through 15 drafts and was eventually abandoned without being submitted to the 
State Council.52 Various autonomous prefectures and counties have received approval 
from provincial governments for basic autonomy laws that largely track the LRNA 
content. Autonomous regions and other areas have enacted many “separate 
regulations.”53 A third category would be ordinary laws unrelated to autonomy, which 
do not require such higher approval.54 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control over the legislative drafting process 
is a more daunting challenge to autonomy. Chunli Xia describes a complex system of 
CCP oversight of the legislative drafting process as follows: first, the Party 
Committee of the Local People’s Congress (LPC) sets up a legislative group made up 
of people from the LPC Party Committee, the LPC Standing Committee and the local 
government; second, a draft is circulated and submitted by the LPC Standing 
Committee to the Party Committee of the autonomous area; third, after approval by 
the Party Committee of the autonomous area it is then submitted to a higher party 
committee for further review; fourth, when the Party Committee of the autonomous 
area receives approval it submits the draft to the LPC Standing Committee Party 
Committee to be submitted to the LPC for passage.55 Given the center’s control over 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 PRC Constitution (1982), supra note 45, Article 116; LRNA, supra note 47, Article 
19. Such provision is repeated in Article 66 of the Legislative Law. 
51 Id. at 10.  
52 Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman, “Unused Power: Contestation Over Autonomy 
Legislation in the PRC,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 82/1, 2009, pp. 29-46, at 39-40. 
53 Separate regulations are made by autonomous legislative bodies on specific topics 
such as language, marriage, family planning, etc..  
54 See Chunli Xia, Autonomous Legislative Power in Regional Ethnic Autonomy of 
the People’s Republic of China: The Law and the Reality,” in J. Oliveira and P. 
Cardinal, eds., One Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders: Perspectives of 
Evolution (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2009), pp. 541-564 (citing 
Organic Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 7 and the Legislative Law, 
Article 63).  
55 Id.  
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the CCP and the fact that top party officials always come from the center there is little 
room for local legislative initiative.56  
A number of structural and conceptual impediments further limit autonomy. 
First, the replication of the national political structures in minority areas makes such 
areas highly susceptible to top-down central administrative control. The indigenous 
form of government promised in the 1951 Seventeen-point Agreement has not 
survived. Today only Hong Kong and Macau possess such distinctive local self-rule. 
Second, Marxist ideology denies the essential character of China’s policies in Tibet, 
identifying the 1950 occupation of Tibet as “liberation” and the institution of CCP 
rule as “democratic reform.” The Marxist logic views colonialism as only a product of 
capitalist exploitation. Since China never reached the stage of full capitalist 
development it could not in this view have colonized Tibet. Instead, China “liberated” 
the exploited classes of Tibet under a Chinese “internal multinational system,” in a 
“common program” of local autonomous rule.57 Autonomy was merely a temporary 
solution on the path to ultimate assimilation.58 The CCP clearly envisioned that “the 
local Government of Tibet should carry out reform voluntarily.”59 Such system was in 
fact imposed after the 1959 uprising when the Dalai Lama fled. 
After the 1959 Tibetan uprising, all forms of traditional political structure 
were quickly eliminated. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was an especially 
severe period of hard-line class struggle and massive cultural destruction across 
China. In the early 1980s, after Chinese Premier Hu Yaobang observed especially dire 
conditions in Tibet, a remorseful China briefly pursued a policy of liberalization. As 
Tibetans became more outspoken in the slightly more liberal environment this was 
followed by even greater repression and martial law, as hardliners in the Beijing 
regime concluded that liberalization had encouraged greater resistance. In the recent 
decade, a policy of cracking down on political support for the Dalai Lama has 
included so-called “patriotic education” and greater emphasis on economic 
development under which Chinese immigration has been favored.60  
Chinese repression has taken many forms, including military occupation and 
crackdowns, the sacking and razing of Buddhist monasteries, suppression of religion, 
coerced “reeducation” of monks and nuns, imprisonment of dissidents, and the forced 
relocation of rural dwellers and herders to more populated areas. Monks and nuns 
have especially resisted coercion to renounce the Dalai Lama.61 Popular dissent and 
rebellion famously arose in 1959, 1989 and 2008. Increased tensions in Tibet, most 
recently evident in a rash of approximately 40-plus self-immolations over the past !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet 
(comments by Thierry Dodin), supra note 21, at 191-196. 
57 Common Program of the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Committee (1949).  
58 Warren W. Smith,  China's Tibet, supra note 2, at 233. Chinese officials cite 
advanced technology and modern communications to justify direct rule. Interview 
with Liu Hongji, supra note 17. 
59 2009 White Paper, supra note 17, p. 1. 60!Warren!W.!Smith,!“China’s!Policy!on!Tibetan!Autonomy”,!EastGWest!Center!Washington!Working!Papers,!No.!2,!October!2004.!
61 Interview with President, Gu Chu Sun Movement of Tibet (Association of former 
Political Prisoners), Dharamsala, August 3, 2006; Interview of “Singing Nun” 
Renchen Choeky, Dharamsala, August 4, 2006 (Sentenced to prison for 
demonstrating in protest in Lhasa; and sentenced again while in prison when 18 nuns 
produced a singing recording that was smuggled out) 
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year, bear out the continued Tibetan frustration with Chinese policies.62 Rather than 
relax controls and seek accommodation with the Tibetan community the Chinese 
government tends to harden its stance over time. This was most recently evident in the 
March 2012 Chinese government’s decision to put Tibetan monasteries under direct 
Chinese government rule in place of the nominal independence that previously 
prevailed.63 This was seemingly in response to the rash of self-immolations.  
Both the Chinese government and its critics have issued reports. The March 
2009 Chinese White Paper on “Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet” highlights 
favorable statistics on Tibetan participation in autonomous governance, including: 
Tibetans and other minorities holding 94 percent of the seats in local people’s 
congresses; a 96.4 percent voter turnout rate for participation in the electoral process; 
Tibetan and other ethnic minority deputies holding 77 percent of the staff positions in 
state organs at the regional, prefectural and county levels; and a claim of Tibetan 
occupation of the top positions of various autonomous governments and standing 
committees.64 At the time of the report 12 of the 20 deputies from the TAR to the 
National People’s Congress were Tibetan. The report states that the Tibetan language 
is taught in the schools and widely used along with Chinese language—though critics 
worry this is mostly at the primary level.65 Even that has come under threat, with 
recent reports of Tibetan demonstrations against reported Chinese efforts in Qinghai 
autonomous areas to replace Tibetan with Chinese as the primary language of 
instruction in primary schools.66 The report also emphasizes China’s contribution to 
Tibet’s economic development, though critics worry that these policies benefit 
Chinese more than Tibetans.67 The bulk of the report emphasizes China’s “liberation” 
of Tibet and its “democratic reform.” Though the liberation was stated to be from 
“foreign imperial forces,” the text of the report lays greater empirical emphasis on 
liberation from Tibetans themselves, accusing the traditional Tibetan elites of horrific 
feudal practices. No attempt is made to explain why China should assume the role of 
modernizing Tibet. The claimed democratic reform is not much explained, 
overlooking China’s own lack of democratic reform. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Andrew Jacobs, “Tibetan Self-Immolations Rise as China Tightens its Grip,” New 
York Times, March 22, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/asia/in-self-
immolations-signs-of-new-turmoil-in-
tibet.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha22_20120323; Lobsang Sangay, “For 
Tibetans No Other way to Protest,” The Washington Post, July 13, 2012. 
63 Human Rights Watch, “China: Tibetan Monasteries Placed Under Direct 
Rule Decision Ends Long-Standing Policy Allowing Nominal Self-Rule of 
Monasteries,” (New York: March 16, 2012); Chi-yuk Choi, “Stay loyal, troops in 
Tibet told,” SCMP, July 17, 2012. 
64 2009 White Paper, supra note 17. 
65 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet 
(comments by Amy Heller and Anne-Marie Blondeau), supra note 21, at 235. 
66 Edward Wong, “Tibetans in China Protest Proposed Curbs on Their Language,” 
New York Times, October 22, 2010. 
67 Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds., Authenticating Tibet, supra, note 
21  (comments by Andrew M. Fischer), at 250-277. Fischer worries that the current 
subsidies tends to benefit Chinese officials and large Chinese construction companies, 
while creating dependency—what he calls the boomerang effect. Id at 269. Fischer 
sees greater productivity if Tibetans are left to traditional herding and farming. Id. at 
275.  
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A 1997 report of the International Commission of Jurist (ICJ) notes that while 
“Tibetans are in positions of nominal authority, they are often shadowed by more 
powerful Chinese officials” and that “every local organ is shadowed by a CCP 
committee or ‘leading group.’” 68  A 2007 report by Minority Rights Group 
International and Human Rights in China highlights several deficiencies, including 
the centralization of power in the top leadership of the CCP; the above concerns with 
the law-making process, Chinese dominance of CCP leadership in minority areas, 
including Chinese officials from the center always holding the top CCP post, and the 
lack of real power at the local level.69 Of particular concern for the deeply religious 
Tibetan nationality, is a CCP rule that bars party members from practicing Tibetan 
Buddhism and a recently added rule that cadres withdraw their kids from Tibetan 
schools in India.70 Particularly puzzling has been the formal claim by the avowedly 
atheist Chinese government to choose the next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and 
other leading lamas, which recently moved the Dalai Lama to issue his own formal 
statement making clear his own plans for reincarnation or emanation challenging any 
Chinese official role in regard to this matter.71 
 
III. International Legal Standards SelfGdetermination! of! peoples! is! grounded! in! the!UN!Charter! and! in! the!international!human!rights!covenants,!though!these!sources!offer!little!guidance!on! who! are! the! peoples! entitled! to! such! right.! International! law! generally!distinguishes!between!external!and!internal!rights!of!selfGdetermination.72!When!the!external!right,!which!is!thought!to!include!a!right!of!secession,!is!effectively!denied,! justified! or! not,! then! the! internal! right! may! be! all! that! is! practically!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law (Geneva: International Commission of 
Jurists, 1997), 14–21. 
69 Human Rights in China and Minority Rights Group International, China: 
Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension (Minority Rights Group International, 
2007). Available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.Report.pdf . 
70 Kristine Kwok, “Officials to be sacked for sending their children to ‘Dalai Lama 
Schools,’” South China Morning Post, July 18, 2006. 
71 Statement of His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, on the Issue 
of His Reincarnation, 24 September 2011. 
http://dalailama.com/messages/tibet/reincarnation-statement For the Beijing response, 
see Zhuang Pinghui, “We choose next Dalai Lama says Beijing,” South China 
Morning Post, 27 September 2011.  
72 See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, 1960 UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), 15 UN Gaor, Supp. (No. 16), UN Doc. 
A/4684 (1960), at 66; Declarations on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, 1970 UNGA Resolution 2625 
(XXV), Annex, 25 UN Gaor, Supp. (No. 28), UN Doc. A/5217 (1970), at 121. The 
Human Rights Covenants in their first article guarantee “all peoples” the right to 
“freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural rights.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, December 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.  3. As a party to the ICESCR China is 
bound by this. 
! 15!
available.73!Its! exercise! typically! involves! some! notion! of! autonomy,! though!autonomy!has!not!enjoyed!very!strong!protection! in! international! law.74!It!may!be! argued,! however,! that! in! two! circumstances! autonomy! becomes! effectively!internationalized:! 1)!when! it! is! the! consequence! of! treaty! arrangements! or! 2)!when! it! arises! out! of! the! denial! of! rights! of! selfGdetermination,! especially! of!indigenous! peoples.! The! Tibet! case! implicates! both.! The! SeventeenGpoint!Agreement!reflects!a!treaty!arrangement!and!Tibetans!appear!to!be! indigenous!people,!though!the!PRC!has!sought!to!deny!this!status!is!applicable.!For! indigenous! populations,! human! rights,! selfGdetermination! and!autonomy!acquired!greater!international!traction!in!the!2007!UN!Declaration!on!the! Rights! of! Indigenous! Peoples.75!The! Declaration! provides! the! substantive!content! of! internal! autonomy! for! such! populations.!While! UN! declarations! are!generally! not! binding! as! such,! the! nearly! unanimous! passage! (143! to! 4! with!eleven! abstentions)! of! the! Indigenous! People’s! Declaration! along! with! its!purported! restatement! of! existing! customary! law! may! strengthen! claims!concerning! its! binding! effect. 76 !The! Chinese! government! voted! for! the!declaration!but!claims!there!are!no!indigenous!peoples!in!China,77!claiming!5000!years!of!national!unity!and!harmony!with!minorities!living!on!their!own!lands.78!!While! the! UN!Declaration! does! not! define! “indigenous! peoples,”! it! does!specify! they! exist! throughout! the! world.79!A! separate! 1986! UN! study! defined!indigenous!peoples!as!“communities,!…which,!having!a!historical!continuity!with!preGinvasion! and! preGcolonial! societies! that! developed! on! their! territories,!consider! themselves! distinct! from! other! sectors! of! the! societies! now!prevailing....”80!It! also! emphasized! that! such! communities! consider! themselves!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1998) 161 DLR (4th) 385, para. 135, Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
74 D. Sanders, “Is Autonomy a Principle of International Law,” 55 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 17 (1986); F. L. Kirgis, “The Degrees of Self-determination in the 
UN Era,” 88 American Journal of International Law 310 (1994); Hans-Joachim 
Heintze, “Evolution of Autonomy and Federalism,” in Oliveira and Cardinal, supra, 
note 51, pp. 389-408. 75!UN!Declaration!on!the!Rights!of!Indigenous!Peoples,!(hereinafter!“Indigenous!People’s!Declaration)!http://www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/ipr/undrip/OfficialResolution/A61L.67%20eng.pdf.!!
76 Id. Opposing the Declaration were the United States, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia.  
77 “China Concerned with Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in Switzerland, 1997/04/01, http://ch.China-
embassy.org/eng/ztnr/rqwt/t138829.htm 
78 Speech of Chinese Representative Group Deputy Tong Zhihwa, Human Rights 
Council, 1st Meeting, 11th Drafting Session. 
http://www.docip.org/HumanRightsCouncil/sessions1/cddh1_5.pdf .  
79 There are thought to be over 370 million indigenous people worldwide. “UN adopts 
declaration on rights for indigenous peoples worldwide,” International Herald 
Tribune, September 13, 2007. 
80 United Nations Economic and Social Council, UN Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Jose Martinez Coho, Study 
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distinct! from! the! dominant! sector.! The! Tibetan! people,! even! in! China’s! own!accounts!in!the!2009!White!Paper,!clearly!satisfy!these!criteria!of!distinctiveness!as!to!language,!culture!and!history.!Whatever!its!legal!status,!this!UN!Declaration!can! clearly! serve! as! a! useful! guide! by! which! to! measure! the! above! Chinese!policies.!!The!UN!Declaration’s! preliminary! articles! emphasize! demilitarization! of!indigenous! lands;! the! right! of! indigenous! people! to! freely! determine! their!relationship! with! states;! that! treaties,! agreements! and! constructive!arrangements!with!states!are!matters!of!international!concern;!“the!fundamental!importance!of! the! right!of! selfGdetermination!of! all! peoples,! by!virtue!of!which!they! freely! determine! their! political! status! and! freely! pursue! their! economic,!social! and! cultural! development;”! and! that! the! right! to! exercise! selfGdetermination!in!conformity!with!international!law!shall!not!be!denied.!!The! operative! articles! of! the!Declaration! guarantee! indigenous! peoples:!the! right! of! selfGdetermination;81!the! right! to! autonomy! or! selfGgovernment! in!matters! relating! to! their! internal! and! local! affairs;82 !the! right! to! manifest,!practice,!develop!and!teach!their!spiritual!and!religious!traditions,!customs!and!ceremonies,! including!access! in!privacy!to! their!religious!and!cultural!sites!and!control!of!their!ceremonial!objects;83!the!right!to!participate!in!decisionGmaking!in!matters!which!would! affect! their! rights,! through! representatives! chosen! by!themselves!in!accordance!with!their!own!procedures;84!the!right!to!be!consulted!and! prior! consent! through! their! own! representative! institutions! before!implementing! state! legislative! and! administrative!measures;85!and! the! right! to!recognition,! observance! and! enforcement! of! treaties,! agreements! and! other!constructive! arrangements.! At! the! same! time! they! are! guaranteed! the! rights!protected! by! the! various! human! rights! treaties! and! covenants.! China’s!nationwide! imposition! of! topGdown! CCP! control,! its! aboveGnoted! national!minority!policies,! its!dismissive!responses! to!Tibetan!efforts!at!negotiation!and!its!weak! general! protection! of! basic! human! rights! clearly! falls! greatly! short! of!these!standards!of!indigenous!selfGrule.!!
A"Recommended"Path"Forward"The! spirit! of! selfGdetermination! articulated! in! the! UN! Declaration,! in!conjunction! with! Tibet’s! centuriesGlong! tradition! of! selfGrule! and! autonomy,!clearly! calls! for! substantive! change! in! China’s! Tibet! policy.! That! same! spirit!suggests! that! the! Tibetan! indigenous! leadership! be! consulted! over! policy!concerning! their! internal! matters.! The! Tibetan! Memorandum! offers! initial!guidance.!The!good!news!is!that!the!Chinese!Constitution!already!offers!the!tools!in!various!articles!on!autonomy!for!a!flexible!approach!to!the!Tibet!question.!A!flexible! approach! that! fully! implements! China’s! national! minority! laws,!supplemented! where! appropriate! with! guarantees! already! applied! under! the!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/21/Add.8. (hereinafter “UN Working Group Report”)  
81 Indigenous People’s Declaration, supra note 71, Article 3. 
82 Id., Article 4. 
83 Id., Article 12. 
84 Id., Article 18. 
85 Id., Article 19. 
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“one!country,!two!systems”!formula,!can!surely!be!judged!compliant!with!China’s!constitutional! framework.! Foreign!ministries! concerned!with! this! issue! should!encourage!precisely!this!approach!using!the!Tibetan!Memorandum!as!a!point!of!takeoff.! ! The! PRC’s! dismissive! attitude! toward! Tibetan! representations! fails! to!meet!China’s!international!obligations.!!Beyond!the!human!rights!violations,!the!fact!that!these!policies!have!produced!a!nearly!continuous!refugee!flow!for!over!half! a! century! renders! this! a! matter! of! grave! international! concern.! Foreign!governments! have! generally! felt! bound! to! meet! the! Dalai! Lama! during! his!extensive!travels,!often!netting!a!severe!Chinese!response.86!If!there!is!to!be!such!severe!response!in!any!event,!it!seems!these!events!should!be!used!affirmatively!to!promote!the!kinds!of!policies!advanced!in!the!UN!Declaration!and!the!Tibetan!Memorandum.!While! the! PRC!Government! has! long! taken! a! strident! view! that! is! hyperGconcerned!that!relaxing!its!Tibet!polices!will!threaten!national!security,!this!view!seems!unfounded.!In!the!Dalai!Lama,!the!Chinese!Government!faces!a!reasonable!and! influential! interlocutor! who! may! assist! them! greatly! to! address! their!security! concerns! with! a! workable! model! that! would,! on! his! agreement,! be!accepted!by!both!the!Tibetan!and!international!communities.!At!the!same!time!a!workable! model! in! Tibet! would! offer! a! very! useful! model! for! addressing! the!Xinjiang!and!other!peripheral!problems,!each!with!attention!to!the!unique!local!character.! In! some! respects! China’s! own! political! reforms! appear! to! be! held!hostage!to!its!concerns!about!loosing!control!over!its!peripheral!areas.!A!strong!repressive! center! is! seemingly! thought!necessary! to!hold! the! country! together.!Given! peripheral! tensions! and! little! success! at! achieving! the! internal! political!reform! conducive! to! China’s! continuing! development,! a! change! of! approach!seems!warranted.!As!the!Hong!Kong!model!is!sometimes!advanced!as!a!possible!solution!to!the!Taiwan!problem,!an!agreeable!Tibet!model!could!be!offered!as!a!solution! in! Xinjiang! and!possibly! Inner!Mongolia.! In! addition! to! freeing!up! the!path! to! domestic! reform,! these! arrangements!may! likewise! eliminate! some! of!China’s! stickiest! foreign! policy! challenges.! At! present! Tibet! and! Taiwan! are!problems!at!the!heart!of!nearly!every!foreign!policy!outing.!More!magnanimous!gestures! by! China! to! address! these! problems! may! open! the! door! to! China!normalizing! its! international! relations! and! achieving! more! solid! international!standing,! as! fears! over! China’s! rise! may! recede.! At! the! same! time! genuine!autonomy!in!a!gentler!China!may!prove!an!attractive!option!to!China’s!peripheral!communities.!
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86 For a study of Chinese reaction to foreign pressure, generally in the form of 
meetings with the Dalai Lama, see Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, “Paying a 
Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect on International Trade,” Center for European 
Governance and Economic Development, Research Paper No. 113 (2010). See also, 
“Governments Confront China at UN Human Rights Council,” ICT Report, March 
15, 2012. 
